This process will prevent uncertified software from booting. This may have benefits although I can't see them.
You have a new security mechanism to control what can and what can not boot from your hardware. A security feature. You don't feel like you need it until it's too late. But I digress.
I have read a thread on Linux mailing list where a Red hat ...
I just went through this with a recent laptop purchase that came with Windows 8, and UEFI secure boot. After a lot of time and research, here is what I can answer:
Doesn't sound like you fit into the 'home user' category.
The benefits of UEFI the average user will notice is that the first thing they see on their screen will be the Microsoft/Vendor ...
For secure boot to work, your Hardware should support secure boot and your OS should support secure booting.
For HW, you can check in UEFI setting menus and you need to add the certificates/keys provided by the OS
For OS, you can check the support by following commands :
[root@secureboot-guest ~]# cat /sys/kernel/security/securelevel
If output of above ...
For the most part an AV just scans files. It will remove malicious Windows payloads when running on Linux (and vice versa). The detection doesn't depend on the host architecture or operating system at all, as malware code is not being run by the AV at runtime. So, as long as you mount your Windows NTFS partition somewhere under Linux, you can tell your Linux ...
Following is the TYPICAL boot order for a secure boot supported Linux OS :
Shim.efi is loaded
BOOTX64.efi is loaded
BOOTX64.efi requests for grubx64.efi
grubx64.efi request for grub.cfg
grub.cfg loads vmlinuz and initrd
So, in order to support secure boot, you must have BOOTX64.efi signed with your keys. Register your PK(primary key), KEK (Key exchange ...
Flash the ISO on the usb key as you would normally do.
navigate to ~\EFI\boot\
download signed HashTool.efi and PreLoader.efi in there
delete bootx64.efi and rename the PreLoader.efi as such
boot the thing and enroll ~\EFI\boot\loader.efi hash
EDIT: relevant bug
gparted is a nice GUI tool for resizing partitions, or ext partitions at any rate. I have not tried it on NTFS filesystems, although apparently it can.
So yes, you can resize now or later. Just backup your personal tish first, just in case. Of course, if you know what is good for you, you keep that backed-up anyway ;)
Note that you should not resize a ...
I found great article which describes such setup:
tl;dr: Sign grub config and initrd with GPG, generate grub binary which will enforce checks and sign it with secureboot keys.
Package for ubuntu which implements similar idea: https://github.com/JohnstonJ/ubuntu-secure-boot
As Linux does not support Secure Boot as of yet (without some kernel modification), there is no significant consequence of doing this.
is using this "insecure" mode somehow making me more susceptible to any "attacks" or the like
Maybe if you're using Windows, but if you care about security, then you wouldn't be using Windows in the first place. Linux is ...
In X.509v3 certificate lingo, a certificate extension can be specified as critical if the creator of the certificate (and/or the certifying authority) requires that whoever is validating this certificate must understand this extension or else treat this certificate as not valid.
The "Basic constraints" extension is the most fundamental certificate extension:...
More and more Linux distributions are adding the necessary facilities for full support of Secure Boot. That can include include configuring Secure Boot with a custom certificate, and signing third-party modules using that certificate when installed using the distribution's standard procedure. If the provider of the third-party modules provides pre-signed ...
The efibootmgr step only configures the UEFI boot variables of your system to add that particular bootloader on that particular disk (identified by disk UUID in the GPT partition table header) in your system's boot order. It has nothing to do with Secure Boot.
When preparing a UEFI-bootable removable media, you won't need that. For UEFI, a removable media ...
For starters, your computer is NOT BRICKED. Bricked implies you cannot restore functionality easily. Go back into the BIOS Utility (using whichever key is appropriate for your motherboard) and disable Secure Boot. You should then be able to boot from any medium your motherboard supports. If worst comes to worst and you cannot disable Secure Boot, use a ...
Check this guide, maybe it can help you. I can't find how to modify to install debian, because i'm not familiarized with debian. https://thanhsiang.org/faqing/node/221
If you get it, please share the solution.
Actually, the part that verifies Secure Boot signatures is open. It's a part of Intel's TianoCore. The problem is, when you buy off-the-shelf hardware there's no way to check what the hardware vendor actually put inside. But that's a general problem with PC firmware, not Secure Boot as such.
The system-side of Secure Boot in Open Source operating systems ...
I know this questions is old, but since it's still unanswered, and this was a question I had, I figured I'd share what I'd found in my own searches.
I can't give detailed instructions as I never followed through with making my Debian live usb Secure Boot enabled, but this site should ...
First at all: generate own key
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
-subj "/CN=Kernel Key" -outform DER -out kernel.der \
Try to compile linux kernel with CONFIG_EFI_STUB and embed initramfs into it as described here: https://prosauce.org/blog/2015/10/31/booting-linux-securely, to sign modules ...
An old FSF paper suggests that Ubuntu installs a boot-loader (GRUB) signed with their own key, with no link to Microsoft's. The install media relies on the usual Microsoft key.
It implies that the Ubuntu install process loads the Ubuntu key into your UEFI.
So perhaps I cleared the UEFI keys at some point, and then Ubuntu (perhaps its install disc) ...
Looking at this, it would seem that your best bet right now with secure boot is Ubuntu 12.10. Current fedora may also work, but the ubuntu scheme sounds a little more foolproof, since the latter got what amounts to an all-access pass from the OEMs so that each and every driver does not have to be signed.
While Mint is "ubuntu derived", I would guess that ...