While using Linux, I have been doing some research on anonimizing my traffic using various tools. However I am a little confused on all the tools I should be using. Here are some I am currently using:

*After running command apt-get install tor *

nano /etc/proxychains.conf

Then I un-comment Dynamic Chain, and comment out Strict Chain, and edit file:

# add proxy here ...
# meanwile
# defaults set to "tor"
socks4 9050
socks5 9050

So here that was the proxychain section (above). I also heard about DNS leaks that could compromise proxychains, but im not sure which way to go about it.

One way I heard was to do edit /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf to have this:

prepend domain-name-servers,,;
  • The first 2 are the OpenDNS servers they give but im not exactly sure what I am changing when I edit this file. Am I changing this file correctly?

Also another thing I heard to change was the /etc/resolv.conf to have various IP Addresses found on sites like OpenNIC. What am I changing when I edit this file?

So basically I wanted to know what the difference between /etc/dhcp/dhclient.conf & /etc/resolv.conf is. Also should I edit both of these when using proxychains?

And what else can I do to better anonymize myself in Linux.


The default DNS server used by proxychains is , to change the DNS server you should edit your /usr/lib/proxychains3/proxyresolv configuration file.

cat /usr/lib/proxychains3/proxyresolv:

# This script is called by proxychains to resolve DNS names

# DNS server used to resolve names

if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
    echo "  usage:"
    echo "      proxyresolv <hostname> "

export LD_PRELOAD=libproxychains.so.3
dig $1 @$DNS_SERVER +tcp | awk '/A.+[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]/{print $5;}'
  • What will that do if I change it? Also what do you think I should change it to to help better anonymize myself on the web?
    – iamr00t
    Jul 17 '17 at 0:52

One of the very best ways to protect Tor's link privacy is to compartmentalize Tor, Torbrowser and other apps within virtual machines based on a security-focused hypervisor. The result is that exploits against your client programs (browser, chat, etc.) are likely to stay contained in the app's VM and will have no way to reveal your clearnet IP, Tor keys, or any info from apps running in other VMs.

Whonix fits this description and it endeavors to be the most secure Tor configuration that is widely available. In particular, the Whonix-Qubes version is best equipped to protect anonymity because the Qubes security architecture is so thorough.

Connections through Tor are enforced. DNS leaks are impossible, and even malware with root privileges cannot discover the user's real IP address.

Downsides are that it uses lots of RAM and there is a learning curve. But the VMs use Linux which should lend it a degree of familiarity.

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