I'm reading an article in Master Linux Now 2013 called OpenSSH: Easy Logins and it uses ssh-agent to allow you to enter a passphrase for your key once, and then you're able to connect to a remote machine freely without typing it again while the ssh-agent is running.

The reason I was drawn to the article in the first place, aside from not having to retype my password a million times; was so that I could do unattended backups from /to remote machines by calling rsync from cron on a machine remote to the server over ssh;

I saw another article where someone just skipped the passphrase so that cron could easily use the key to login, it doesn't feel right, but is this okay to do in practice? I mean if somebody got hold of that key file they'd be able to wreak havoc on the machine getting backed up.

It seems to me it would be safer to make sure the user is logged in upon reboot and to have them enter the passphrase once, when they login to get the agent running and then just wait for the cron job to run with the screen locked; but I'm likely missing something here, like about what user or user types cron jobs run with.

1 Answer 1


Restrict the commands that can be invoked by the key

If an SSH key is going to be used by any kind of automated or unattended task, you should restrict what commands it is able to execute on a remote machine, no matter what decision you make about how and where to store the key.

Use something like this in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys:

command="/usr/sbin/the-backup-daemon" ssh-rsa AAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBXXXXXX.....

That way, at least the key should not be able to, as you say, wreak havoc. It can only access what it's supposed to access, etc... It can most likely still do damage, but it should have less than full access to the remote system.

You can also restrict the IP addresses that are allowed to connect using that key and disable a bunch of other SSH features like port forwarding for connections where that key is used:

from="",no-port-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-pty,command="/usr/sbin/the-backup-daemon" ssh-rsa AAAAAAAAAAAAXXXXXX.....

All that has to go on a single line in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.

Protecting the key

It depends on what your threat model is.

If you're worried about the key being stolen while "cold", for example, having the computer where it is saved physically stolen, then you won't want to save it without a passphrase in that location.

You could start a kind of background SSH agent manually after the server boots, add the key to that agent, and record the agent's $SSH_AUTH_SOCK for future use by the cron job, but honestly that sounds like more trouble than it's worth. You might as well just store the unencrypted key in a tmpfs filesystem and have the cron job access it from there. Either way the key lives in memory only (if you have no swap or encrypted swap). Of course you should chown and chmod the file so only the target user can access it.

Then again, if you're worried about that, you've probably already set up this computer with an encrypted root filesystem and swap (e.g. luks) so you may not need to worry about it as such.

If you're worried about the key being stolen while "hot" (loaded in memory) then there's not much you can do about that. If the cron job can access it, then so can something else that has managed to gain the same access. It's that, or give up the convenience of unattended job execution.

In conclusion, you should treat a backup server as a very privileged system since it will, by necessity, be given read-only access to the complete filesystems of all the computers it backs up. Your backup server should not be accessible from the Internet, for example.

  • In addition to the things you've already mentioned, I'd recommend also limiting where the key can connect from. You do this by adding from=ipaddress.or.hostname at the start of the key, together with the command.
    – Jenny D
    Commented Jul 7, 2015 at 12:37

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