2

On FreeBSD all graphical terminal programs (e.g. xterm, rxvt) seem to be installed setuid root, or with setuid root wrappers.

On Linux, this is not the case on any distribution I have ever used.

Why does FreeBSD require setuid executables or wrappers for terminal programs? This seems like a great way to introduce privilege escalation holes.

  • 1
    By terminal program you mean what exactly? Something like getty or something like xterm or even any non-graphical program? – Fabian Sep 18 '14 at 20:42
  • Whoops, I mean graphical terminals like xterm. I will update the question. – DanL4096 Sep 18 '14 at 20:46
3

The original xterm was a set-uid program. One reason why is it needed to be able to write to the utmp file to record who was using what device. Another reason was xterm needs to get the ownership of the pseudo-tty device used as its standard input/output and error to set that ownership to the user accessing it.

While most other Unix/Unix like OSes no more use the setuid or setgid bits to achieve the same goal, but different and safer methods, FreeBSD looks to have kept the original solution.

1

Barring some temporary bug report/fix (not found in the port's changelog), FreeBSD does not require xterm to be setuid, and has not used that with xterm since 2011. The port maintainer's comment said

- Don't set suid bit. In our implementation, grantpt() and unlockpt() don't
  actually have any use, because PTY's are created on the fly and already have
  proper permissions upon creation (see src/lib/libc/stdlib/ptsname.c) [1]

Which refers to changes made in 2008:

  The pts(4) driver also implements this feature, which means
  posix_openpt() will now return PTY's that are created on the fly.

Given this question in 2014 sounds as if OP was looking at an old system. Or (this does happen), OP's system may have been modified by someone, adding the setuid bit.

Depending on the platform (and its age), xterm would use setuid or setgid for these operations:

  • opening the pseudo terminal
  • updating utmp (or utmpx)

Originally, BSD (and other) pseudo-terminal implementations required the application to find the special device and then open it using root setuid rights. Unix98 did away with the first part (finding the special device), starting in 1999. Most pseudo-terminal implementations by around 2005 had eliminated the need for the application to be installed using setuid. It was overlooked in FreeBSD for whatever reason.

Likewise, applications may need group permissions (via setgid) to update the utmp (or utmpx) file which is used by last and who. xterm has provided for using the utempter library for this purpose since 2000. The FreeBSD port for xterm uses this feature, so it does not require setgid either.

Other programs may be installed as setuid or setgid for the same operations, but by 2014 it was unlikely that any terminal program needed the setuid permissions for the root user. When used in other programs (such as urxvt) it likely has been overlooked by their maintainers.

0

Good point, I have not noticed it that this was still the case, but however. There are ways how to limit the damage it can do, maybe with this new capsicum they are working on. But for all X (Xorg) applications I would say, first Wayland has to come in and then we can talk about security on a computer that is running X for real. Such little problems, like the xterm being able to announce a terminal, that can be resolved then in five minutes. Xorg is a big huge security hole.

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.