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I found that, in /etc/inittab, this modification (-a username) for the user u disables the login/password check for all tty:s:

1:2345:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty1
2:23:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty2
3:23:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty3
4:23:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty4
5:23:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty5
6:23:respawn:/sbin/getty -a u 38400 tty6

That would be great for me, not having to type the password all the time!

Question is, apart from the case when the computer gets stolen, the thief could use the system (which I would prefer, come to think of it), what security implications does this configuration have?

Possibly relevant: The second column (runlevels).

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up vote 1 down vote accepted

I use autologin, not just disable the password ;-)

If your disk is not encrypted, they could just boot from external media and steal your data. So autologin isn't a problem for thieves, but people near you (that can access your computer when you're not here).

Just don't let people around you know that they could login as root without password...


In this case, you run autologin at local tty, remote login normally use pts (pesudo tty), they don't interfere each other

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OK, what I meant was, is there a "remote" threat? – Emanuel Berg Oct 17 '12 at 2:21
@EmanuelBerg updated – warl0ck Oct 17 '12 at 2:28

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